Analysis of the Current State of Iran-US Tensions

Five thoughts on Witkoff's comments and general US-Iran tensions right now:

1. Good Cop, Bad Cop

The only new thing I heard was Witkoff saying they've received messages from Iran. Otherwise this was mostly the good cop routine, compared to the more hostile, belligerent bad cop we've been hearing in the past few weeks.

The way he characterized Trump's letter was basically the same as what Araghchi described in the Nowruz show. Both threats and opportunities.

In action, the US has been quite belligerent recently. Both in Yemen and gradually scaling up sanctions. This is the same carrot and stick method we've seen for 25 years, though they're being more explicit about it.

2. A Preview of the Future

What I found more interesting was how he described things. This was why I put on Persian subtitles (which was done a bit rushed).

The first part, where he keeps going on and on about Trump's strength, is a good preview of their strategy to counter domestic criticism if a deal is made. They clearly do anticipate strong criticism.

Beyond this, the following excerpt was quite telling:

"And yet, and the president is a president who doesn't want to go to war and he'll use military action to stop a war. That's when he actually wants to use military action."

The situation in the US is different in 2025 than it was in 2002. The public is not going to respond well to openly saying they will start a war - even the Trump worshipping Republicans.

Instead, this is how they'll justify it. Basically they will say "we have no choice but to take military action, because an Iranian nuclear weapon is a real threat".

This is why I believe it is imperative for Iran to be very specific about public messaging.

The best message in this situation, if Trump is making unmeetable demands, is to publicly reiterate that what Trump is asking for is beyond verification of the nuclear program.

The court of public opinion is critical. Make it clear that he does have a choice and he is the one being excessive.

3. Neither Country Wants War

Iran faces an challenging set of compounding crises. It is under extreme economic pressure, having difficulty dealing with things like electricity and water, and as we saw today, has the potential for escalating ethnic tensions jumping to the surface at any time.

Adding a war on top of all of this really isn't on its agenda. That doesn't mean it will just accept any imposed conditions - but it will push very hard to avoid that situation.

The United States also does not want war. All this talk about air defenses is a distraction - Iran's air defenses were never the reason there wasn't a conflict. The reason was fears about what would happen the day after the strikes.

There are some in the US who are trying to argue that strikes on nuclear sites will not be all out war and will be containable. This is insanity.

Iran retains the capability and willingness to respond in situations of extreme pressure. It shot back, directly, on three separate occasions. Each time was an escalation compared to the previous.

No shooting two hundred ballistic missiles at someone is not "symbolic". And just because the situation did not escalate in previous times does not mean the world will get that lucky in the future. When you play Russian roulette long enough, eventually you will lose.

Iran has exercised some precaution (such as giving pre warnings & limiting to certain targets) in the past because it wants to avoid attacks on critical targets in its own soil.

If those strikes happen anyway ... it will be far less restrained.

And its retaliation would not be limited to well protected bases - there are plenty of vulnerable targets in the Persian Gulf & in the region that could cause immense pain to the global economy.

Trump understands this. Despite everything he did in his first term, he avoided entering full war on several opportunities. He is also particularly sensitive to his personal brand. Going to war with Iran (in his first year too) is not the image he wants.

That doesn't mean there isn't a growing danger of war, but both sides have significant incentives to avoid it.

The more probable risk is that in the escalating game of chicken, one side crosses a red line that makes any negotiations in the near future out of the question (this happened in 2020). I suspect this is what Netanyahu is aiming for.

4. Trump Style of Negotiations

Trump's style of negotiations is to make multiple extreme threats paired with maximalist demands & eventually compromise with better concessions than he would have gotten otherwise.

What he's doing with Iran is similar to what he tried with North Korea in his first term (though those didn't have a long lasting settlement at the end). He values showmanship & is willing to break taboos.

This is a poor method to negotiate with the Islamic Republic.

The Islamic Republic places great importance on optics. It prefers to negotiate (and make potential concessions) behind closed doors. Public threats make it less willing to give concessions it might have agreed to otherwise.

Sending a letter wasn't a terrible idea, but making it so public & having all sorts of leaks about supposed threats in it cancels out the benefits.

5. Iranian Reluctance

There is a lot of confusion about the Iranian position.

Iran's current position is not that it is not willing to engage with negotiations over its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief - it is that it isn't willing to directly negotiate with the US.

Why?

One has to look at the core of the Islamic Republic system. What is the purpose of having a Supreme Leader or IRGC at all?

Their foremost goal is to preserve the Islamic Republic. Right after that is to preserve the "revolutionary nature" of the system.

There has always been a faction within the system that believed that Iran's problem with the US must one day be solved. It used to be led by Hashemi Rafsanjani & currently by Hassan Rouhani.

But there is competing faction that disagrees. They believe a full settlement with the US, if possible at all, would mean having to compromise on the revolutionary nature of the Islamic Republic.

Normalization with the US would mean sitting on the sidelines and doing nothing while Israel ethnically cleanses Gaza & turns Lebanon into a puppet state. It would contradict the very basis of the Islamic Republic's worldview.

The Supreme Leader does not completely belong towards either camp. He has allowed people from the first group make moves towards the US (with restrictions) in the past.

However those attempts all failed. In recent years he has moved much closer to the second group.

Would he be willing to make a deal - a multilateral one with the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, or others - to make some concessions on specific issues in return for sanctions relief? Perhaps.

Would he even want a "grand bargain" type deal with the US moving towards full normalization? This is less likely. At this point at least.

The problem is Trump cares about his own image. I'm not sure if he finds a multilateral deal that doesn't include his name all over it appealing.

Conclusion

None of these issues are insurmountable. It is possible to have some sort of diplomatic agreement. If what Witkoff is saying about having received messages from Iran is true, that's a step forward.

But the path is undoubtably difficult and complicated.

The common goal of avoiding an uncontained military conflict may help ultimately overcome all the obstacles.

And it shouldn't be forgotten that this entire crisis is an unnecessary one:

The root cause was Donald Trump's stupid & irresponsible decision to pull out of the original agreement.